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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 1, 1872, President Ulysses S. Grant signed into law the Yellow-
stone National Park Organic Act.' Described in part as a "tract of land in the
States of Montana and Wyoming, lying near the headwaters of the Yellow-
stone River," Yellowstone National Park was the first national park in the
nation and set a precedent for the creation of other national parks within the
United States and worldwide. By 1916, several other national parks had been
established and Congress created the National Park Service (NPS) to manage
the national parks in conformance with its intent to "conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such a manner and by such means as will leave them
ummpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."'
Considerable debate continues over how the NPS ought to manage national
parks in order to best meet its mandate from Congress, but it seems clear that
most Americans believe that national parks ought to be kept free from the
lands of resource extraction known all too well on other public lands such as
national forests.3 The National Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA), implicitly
contains a "nonimpairment requirement [that] constitutes a clear substantive
standard requiring the Park Service to protect the natural integrity of the land-
scape when humans pressure comes into conflict with resource values."4
Moreover, Yellowstone was created during a time when resource extraction
was running rampant in other parts of the United States:
[r]uthless exploitation of natural marvels stimulated an uneasi-
ness that was felt more generally about the bourgeoning spirit of
enterprise mn the country. Houses were going up, and trees com-
ing down, with such unbridled energy that it was easy to wonder
whether Americans valued anything but the prospect of in-
* J.D. 1998, University of Montana School of Law.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994); R.S. § 2474, 17 Stat. 32
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1, Act of August 25, 1916, c.408 § 1, 39 Stat.535; Ex. Ord. No. 6166, § 2, June 10,
1933, Mar. 2, 1934, c. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 389.
3. See Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge andProfit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy
and the Core Purposes ofAmenca'sNational Parks, 26 ECOLOaYL. Q. 401 (1999) [hereinafter Doremus].
4. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management",
65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 293, 304; see also Conservation Law Found. v. Hodel, 864 F.2d 954 (1" Cir. 1989);
Organized Fisherman v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544 (1 1' Cir. 1985), cert. dered, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Wilder-
ness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F. 2d 1250 (9" Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 982 (1980).
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creased wealth[.
The idea of publicly held parks was not only a predictable
response to the despoliation and avarice, it also harmonized with
a principle that was at the very crest of its influence in American
land policy The [Yellowstone] era was also the time of Home-
stead and Desert Land acts, when every American family was to
have its share of public domain free of monopolization by the
rich. The application of that principle to the great scenic wonders
could not be realized by granting a sequoia grove or Grand Can-
yon to each citizen. But it was possible to preserve spectacular
sites for the average citizen by holding them as public places to
be used and enjoyed by everyone.5
Many people believe that the creation of Yellowstone National Park and the
national park system has set a precedent based upon the premise that "[i]n
today's world, the parks should be places where the populace can be inspired
with the wonder of nature anc the understanding that some things are too
special to be sold."6 Ironically, perhaps, on Yellowstone's 125 Anniversary,
the NPS announced it had signed an agreement with Diversa Corporation, a
biotechnology company, whereby Diversa would be allowed to sample and
collect ncroorganisms primarily from Yellowstone's geothermal pools. 7 This
agreement set a wholly new precedent within the national park system by
opening park resources to commercial exploitation.8 Although the Park Ser-
vice had provided for the extraction of microorganisms from within the park
in the past, the agreement with Diversa represented the first time in which the
NPS stood to benefit financially from potential royalties generated from a
private company's development of park resources should such findings prove
commercially marketable. 9
Following the announcement of the agreement with Diversa, three non-
profit organizations, the Edmonds Institute, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies,
and the International Center for Technological Assessment, filed suit, claiming
that the NPS illegally entered into the agreement, known as a Cooperative
5. JOSEPH L. SAx, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS, REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL PARKS 8
(1980).
6. Doremus, supra note 3, at 438.
7. See id. at 402-03.
8. Id.
9. Cooperative Research and Development Agreement for a Project Between Yellowstone National
Park/National Park Service and Diversa Corporation, Signed May 4, 1998, Robert Stanton, Dir., NPS, and
Michael Finley, Supenntendent, Yellowstone National Park, Signed May 5, 1998; Terrance J. Bruggerman,
Chairman, President and ChiefExecutive Officer, Diversa Corporation [hereinafter CRADA]. Importantly,
the terms of the CRADA provided for the extraction of Park resources and is therefore distinguishable from
other types of commercial activity within the Park (i.e. concessions).
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Research and Development Agreement (CRADA).' ° At issue m this suit,
Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, was first, whether the CRADA constituted a
"major federal action"; second, whether Yellowstone National Park had the
statutory authority to enter into such agreements; third, whether bio-prospect-
ing ran afoul of the National Park Service purposes; and fourth, whether the
public trust doctrine precluded the NPS from entering such an agreement."
The suit sought both declaratory and mjunctive relief on all counts until such
time as the court had the opportumty to review the merits of the case."
The plaintiffs in Edmonds argued that, notwithstanding the benefits of the
CRADA touted by the Park Service and Diversa, the precedential quality of
allowing the NPS to benefit from private commercialization of park resources
could fundamentally alter how our national parks are managed.1 3 The court
bifurcated the ruling in Edmonds, ruling primarily on procedural matters in
Edmonds I, and then on the merits of the remaimng claims in Edmonds II.
The Edmonds I court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing, then ruled that the
CRADA was a major federal action for the purposes of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act and required the NPS to complete an environmental assess-
ment.'5 The Edmonds I court also dismissed plaintiffs' public trust doctrine
argument.' 6 About one year later, in Edmonds II, the court ruled that the NPS
CRADA with Diversa did not violate the Yellowstone Organic Act, the Na-
tional Park Service Organic Act, or the Federal Technology Transfer Act, thus
holding for the NPS on all remaimng counts. 7
This note highlights the arguments presented in Edmonds, and discusses the
court's resolution of these issues. This note concludes that although the court
applies a reasoned analysis to uphold the CRADA, the court's decision opens
the door to future commodification of national park resources, which had
hitherto been unavailable for commercial extraction.
II. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 1997, the NPS commemorated the 125 t' anmversary of the
establishment of Yellowstone National Park. 8 During the ceremony, the Park
Service announced that it had entered into an agreement with Diversa Corpo-
10. Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, 42 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter Edmonds 1].
I1. Id.
12. Id.
13. Plaintiffs Complaint at 25-26.
14. See Edmonds I and Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt Civ. Action 98-561 (RCL) Memorandum
Opimion of Apr. 12, 2000 [hereinafter Edmonds II].
15. Edmonds I at 14, 19.
16. Id. at 16.
17. Edmonds I at 1.
18. Edmonds f at 4.
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ration to give Diversa a "non-exclusive right to 'bioprospect' microbial organ-
isms in Yellowstone in exchange for an agreement to share potential financial
returns with the Park."' 9 Pursuant to the CRADA, the NPS issued a Research
Authonzation/Collection permit to Diversa in 1998 authorizing "the collection
of biological tissues, soils, sediments, water, and rocks from Yellowstone."2
While the CRADA nght provide the Park Service with substantial scien-
tific benefits, the most unique feature of the CRADA is the consideration the
Park stands to receive in exchange for access to the Park's natural resources.2'
"The Yellowstone-Diversa CRADA marks the first time in history that an
American national park would stand to gain financially from scientific discov-
eries made within its borders."2 Ultimately, the issue at hand is whether
allowing commercial bioprospecting within National Parks will crack the door
open to a slow erosion of the long-standing ban on commercial development
of other natural resources within national park boundaries. To understand the
significance of the shift in policy embodied in the CRADA at issue, it is
necessary briefly to explain the emerging field of "bioprospecting."23
Bioprospecting is, quite literally, prospecting for microscopic resources, the
genetic and biochemical information found in wild plants, animals, and micro-
organisms.24 Uses of products developed from material discovered through
bioprospecting include "stripping the paint from old Navy boots, to extraction
of gold from ore, to DNA fingerprinting, to fighting cancer. 2 5
As the demand for bioprospecting has grown, so have the places from which
the bioprospecting companies have sought to extract organisms, including
Yellowstone National Park." Interestingly, Yellowstone holds "an estimated
eighty percent of the world's terrestrial geysers and more than half of its ther-
mal features, including hot pools, and fumeroles. '27 Park scientists have dis-
covered that the Park's thermal features contain a microbial community with
a biological diversity similar in degree to tropical rainforests.28
19. Id.
20. Edmonds I at 5, n. 1.
21. Id. at 5. Notwithstanding requests from members of Congress and at least two Freedom of
Information Act lawsuits, defendant Park Service refused to refused to disclose to the plaintiffs or the court
the specific details of the consideration it would receive under the CRADA. While the NPS did eventually
disclose that it would receive between ".5% and 10%" of the royalties generated by Diversa from the
microorganisms extracted from the Park, it has more recently come to light that the Park would receive only
the .5%, and nothing more. Yellowstone Collects 0.5% Royalty On Bio-Deal, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Oct.
4, 1999.
22. Edmonds I at 5.
23. Id. at 5.
24. See generally, John R. Adair, Comment, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States
Charge Biotechnology Companies for the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources?, 24 ECOL-
OGYL.Q. 131, 132-33 (1997).
25. Edmonds I at 6.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. Id. at 7.
20001 BIOPROSPECTING IN NATIONAL PARKS
With such a wealth of microbial life within the Park's boundaries, it is not
surprising that the Park Service has been under increasing pressure to make
Park resources available for microbial resource extraction. The Park infor-
mally played host to some form of bioprospecting as early as 1898.29 More
recently, an enzyme discovered in 1966 within Yellowstone near Old Faithful
has greatly assisted scientists in copying minute DNA samples.3" Yellowstone
now receives an average of 1,500 requests from researchers annually, and
issues approximately 250-300 research perimts each year, of which 40-50 are
for microbial research.3" The NPS regulates this permitting system with the
intent that all research is consistent with the Park's overall goals3 2
Prior to the CRADA at issue in Edmonds, researchers were free to remove
any specimen allowed by their permit and develop it as they chose.33 If the
development led to commercial uses, the NPS never received any proceeds
from the product derived from the park resource.34 In response to serious
funding shortfalls, and recogmzing the potential for substantial financial re-
turns from such resources, the NPS began to consider a "dramatic shift" in
park management policy 35 Rather than continuing to treat biochemical and
genetic resources as a "common heritage of manland," the Park Service began
to consider these resources as a means of generating funds and creating incen-
tives for the conservation of biological diversity 36
The NPS began to negotiate with Diversa and other biotechnology compa-
nies in 1995."7 Although the NPS allowed Park resources to be extracted for
commercial purposes in the past, it lacked the regulatory mechanism to allow
the Park itself to benefit financially through a profit-sharing arrangement with
private entities. The NPS thus turned to authority under the FTA to provide
the potential avenue by which the Park Service could enter into such a profit-
sharing agreement.3" Under the terms of the FTTA, such an agreement is
categorized as a CRADA.39 The FITA provides authority only for federal
laboratories to enter into CRADAs with non-federal or private entities to
"facilitate the sharing of research performed by government scientists."'
29. Id.
30. Id. at 6. The court noted that patent on the enzyme was eventually sold "in 1991 for $300 million
to a company and now generates over $100 million annually." Id. The NPS, however, has not received any
compensation for the use of the Park resource. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 7-8.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. (emphasis added). Whether Yellowstone National Park was a "laboratory" under the FITA
would become a critical issue in Edmonds If.
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When plaintiffs first learned of the NPS CRADA with Diversa, they submit-
ted a petition for rulemaking and collateral relief to the NPS requesting that
the NPS perform an environmental impact study and provide the public with
notice of the proposed change in policy prior to entering the CRADA.4 The
Park Service refused the request.42
The CRADA signaled a "major change" in Park management policy on
scientific research.43 According to documents obtained by plaintiffs pursuant
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), NPS officials had recognized the
precedential quality of entering a CRADA with a private entity as early as
1996: "Any precedent set will affect all parks, and may influence profitable
resource access by other industries besides biotech/microbiology""
III. Edmonds I
Having exhausted all other options, and with the signing of the CRADA
imminent, the Edmonds plaintiffs filed suit on March 5, 1998, against Secre-
tary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt and National Park Service Director Robert
Stanton (hereinafter, defendants shall be referred to, collectively, as Interior),
alleging that the CRADA violated the FTTA, the National Park Service Or-
ganic Act (NPSOA), the Yellowstone National Park Organic Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the public trust doctrine, and the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).45 On August 28, 1998, Interior filed a motion
to dismiss the FTTA claim, both claims under the Organic Acts, and the claim
based upon the public trust doctrine.4 6 In addition, Interior filed a motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs" NEPA claim. Plaintiffs subsequently filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment on the NEPA claim. 47
Interior initially chose not to oppose the FTTA and Organic Acts claims on
substantive grounds but rather attempted to dismiss the claims by clairmng that
plaintiffs had "not met the constitutional and prudential requirements of the
standing doctrine."48 The Edmonds I court addressed current doctrines of
constitutional and prudential standing requirements and ultimately concluded
that plaintiffs did have full standing to pursue these claims. 49
Interior also challenged the FTTA, Organic Acts, and public trust doctrine
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. These concerns led to further developments regarding the regulatory structure governing the
park permitting process. This issue is discussed in detail infra.
45. Id. at 9-10.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 10-15.
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claims on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.5" Here, the court agreed with Interior in part and disagreed
m part regarding the FITA claim. Specifically, the court agreed with Interior
that the FTTA applies to an agency that has contracted out the operation of a
"federal laboratory to a non-federal entity, a circumstance which is not present
in this case."'" Moreover, the court agreed that vague provisions within the
FTTA that simply state that its provisions are not intended to limit or dirmmsh
existing authorities of an agency do not "provide the [c]ourt with any judi-
cially manageable standard by which to review agency action, and thus it
cannot give rise to a cause of action."52
However, the court stated that Interior had "convemently ignore[d]" the fact
that plaintiffs' claim under the FTrA was also brought under the APA by
alleging that the NPS's action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion and otherwise not m accordance with law "53 The court found that the
APA "provides plaintiffs a cause of action with winch to challenge interpreta-
tions of law and other final agency actions alleged to be in violation of a stat-
ute."54 Thus, the court ruled that plaintiffs had successfully stated a cause of
action under the FTTA though they had not stated it with "perfect clarity "55
Interior likewise claimed that the NPSOA and the Yellowstone Organic Act
cannot "conceivably give rise to a cause of action" because the NPSOA pro-
vides absolute discretion to the NPS in carrying out its purposes.56 In this
instance, the court wholly disagreed with Interior's motion for dismissal,
citing several recent circuit decisions upholding the plaintiffs' claim by virtue
of the fact that the NPSOA provides "broad, butnot unlimited discretion in
determining what actions are best calculated to protect Park resources.
namely, the conservation of wildlife resources."57 The court clearly agreed
with earlier precedent that the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard ap-
plied, thereby warranting further exanunation of the merits of the claims58
For these reasons, the court demed Interior's motion to dismiss these claims.59
The court, however, flatly distrssed plaintiffs' public trust doctrine claim,
stating that Congress had "supplanted any trust obligations by enacting the
detailed regulatory system governing the national parks."'0
50. hM at 15.
5 i. Id. Ironically, defendants would later argue at length that Yellowstone National Park is, in fact,
a "laboratory." Tlus is discussed in detail infra.
52. Id.
53. Id. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702,706 (1994).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 15-16. (citations omitted).
58. 1. at 16.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 17 (citing Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443,449 (D.D.C. 1980)).
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Finally, Interior moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' NEPA claim,
arguing simply that NEPA's provisions were not applicable to the present
action.6 The court first found that in NEPA, Congress had declared a "broad
national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental quality ,62
The court then considered whether the CRADA constituted a "major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,"
which would subject the action to the provisions of NEPA and its implement-
ing regulations-and thus be required to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), or, at a minimum, an Environmental Assessment (EA).63
The determination of whether an agency action falls under NEPA's provi-
sions is subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard.' Here, the fact that
the defendants provided no evidence that a categorical exclusion wasjustified
prior to the CRADA was "practically determinative" in the court's ultimate
holding." The court thus ordered the NPS to "suspend operation of the
[CRADA] and prepare an environmental assessment in accordance with the
requirements of the NEPA." 66
In sum, the court in Edmonds I concluded that plaintiffs did have standing
to bring claims under the FTTA, the NPSOA, and the Yellowstone Organic
Act; NEPA did apply to the development of the CRADA, and that the public
trust doctrine alone did not preclude the Park Service from developing and
signing the CRADA. The court left the merits of the FTTA and Organic Acts
claims to decide in Edmonds IL
IV Edmonds II
In Edmonds I, Interior argued in part that plaintiffs had failed to meet the
constitutional requirement of redressability on their FTTA claim.67 Specifi-
cally, Interior claimed that "removing the commercial aspect of research and
collection activity in the Park cannot possibly redress any alleged injury to
plaintiffs' aesthetic injuries. 68 In discussing this issue, the court stated that
Interior's assertion
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 18. The NPS here chose to employ a provision of its manual that allows an agency of the
Interior Department to categorically exclude particular types of federal actions from further NEPA review.
See Dep't of Int. Dep't Manual, 516 DM 7, App. 7 § 7.4(E)(2).
64. Edmonds / at 18 (citing National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776,781 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
65. Id. at 18.
66. Id. at 20. The court noted, however, that it was concerned solely with enforcing the procedural
requirements of NEPA and did not "express any view as to the substantive validity of bioprospecting as a
natural resource management strategy, in national parks or elsewhere." Id. at n. 12.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
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ignores the reality that the commercial nature of an activity can
and does affect its impact on the subject environment and partic-
ularly on people's aesthetic and recreational interests in the Park.
Although parkgoers may be willing to forgive the trespass of
their national parkland when the goals of that trespass are scien-
tific and educational, commercial exploitation of that same park-
land may reasonably be perceived as injurious.69
The court cited Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit had found standing for plaintiffs to challenge a Department of Interior
decision to allow commercial fishing in Glacier Bay 70 The Jensen court had
reasoned that "finding in plaintiffs' favor, that commercial fishing is statuto-
rily prohibited in Glacier Bay, would result in the elimination of commercial
fishing in the relevant areas. This would redress plaintiffs' claimed injuries."'"
Similarly, the Edmonds I court stated that there is "an undemable reality that
commercial activity is qualitatively different than scientific and educational
activity of a similar nature, due to the very different forces and motivations
that drive them."72 Then the Edmonds I court concluded that "[i]f the court
invalidates the CRADA, or enjoins its exercise pending the completion of an
environmental impact statement then the plaintiffs' injuries will be re-
dressed. Therefore, plaintiffs have established redressability "'
Regarding Interior's assertion that the plaintiffs failed to establish pruden-
tial standing to bring an FTTA claim, the court first described the NPS inter-
pretation of the term "laboratory" under the FTTA as "amazingly broad."'74
Then the court looked to Chem Serv., the only federal court of appeals ruling
to consider the "zone of interests" covered by the FITA.75 In Chem Serv., the
Third Circuit determined that because the FITA's CRADA provisions were
integrally related to federal procurement laws, "[t]o the extent that a CRADA
is used to circumvent the statutory and regulatory requirements of the federal
procurement laws, we find that Congress intended potential bidders to such a
contract to be within the zone of interests protected under the FTTA."'76
Based upon the Chem Serv. ruling, the Edmonds court found that although
69. Id.
70. 108 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9- Cir. 1991).
71. Id.
72. Edmondslat 13.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 14. Drawing upon the administrative record, the court referred to the Park Service's interpre-
tation that not only all national parks, but possibly all federal lands could be characterized as "laboratones"
under the FITA. Id.
75. Id. (citing Chem Serv., Inc. v. Environmental Monitonng Sys. Lab.-Cincinnati, 12F.3d 1256,1267
(3d Cir. 1993)).
76. Edmonds I at 14 (citing Chem Serv. at 1267).
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it is not readily apparent that the FTTA shares a similar "integral" relationship
with the laws governing the NPS and national park system, "if the [NPS]
insist[s] on interpreting the FTTA to apply to Yellowstone (and potentially to
other parks and federal lands), then the relationship between the two bodies
of law grows closer to point that an 'integral' relationship is shown. 77 Impor-
tantly, however, the Edmonds court further stated that
[t]he intuitive barrer to this decision is that it seems absurd that
an entire two-million-acre national park should be considered a
"laboratory" under the FITA. It is precisely the defendants who
are to blame for this interpretation, however, and it would be
inequitable to allow an agency to avoid review of its action taken
pursuant to a statute merely by adopting an absurd interpretation
of that statute.78
When considering the FTTA claim, the court agreed with Interior in part,
finding that the "clear and unambiguous terms" of the FVTA "apply only to
an agency that has contracted out the operation of a federal laboratory to a
non-federal entity, a circumstance which is not present in this case.79 Interior
had also claimed that the NPSOA and Yellowstone Organic Act cannot "con-
ceivably give rise to a cause of action."8° Interior based its claim on the notion
that these acts provide such broad discretion to the NPS in carrying out its
mission that its decision to sign the CRADA was beyond judicial review "
In response, the court reminded defendants that this assertion is "inconsis-
tent with past decisions of this and other courts."82 Citing relevant case law,
the court stated that at least the NPSOA provides "broad, but not unlimited
discretion in determining what actions are best calculated to protect Park re-
sources."83 The Court then referred to a line of prior case law in which courts
had found various Park Service programs to be inconsistent the NPSOA.8"
Of particular relevance to the case presently before the Court is
a line of decisions by this and other courts that have reviewed the
1970 and 1978 amendments to the NPSOA and found those
amendments to reflect a renewed insistence on the part of Con-
gress that the national parks be managed in accordance with the
77. Id. at 14.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Daingerfield Island Protective Society v. Babbitt, 40 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
84. Id. at 15-16.
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primary purpose of the NPSOA, namely the conservation of
wildlife resources.85
Finally, the court found unconvincing Interior's claim that its permitting
regulations render the prohibition on the "sale or commercial use of natural
products inapplicable," "primarily because the regulations governing
research permits by their own terms are applicable only to scientific and edu-
cational research and do not contemplate commercial research., 86 Based upon
the court's analysis on these standing issues in Edmonds I, therefore, one may
have speculated that plaintiffs would prevail m Edmonds II. This was, how-
ever, not to be the case.
A. Is Yellowstone National Park a "Laboratory"2
Plaintiffs characterized their FTTA claim as askmg "whether defendants can
legislate a dramatic shift in federal lands management by allowing a national
park to contract away natural resources to a private, commercial entity through
a CRADA" In Edmonds I, court had found that the APA provides for such
a claim to be brought.8 The APA dictates that a reviewing court "shall hold
unlawful and set aside agency action in excess of statutoryjunsdiction, author-
ity or limitations, or short of statutory right."89 Plaintiffs simply claimed that
entering into the CRADA exceeded "the authority granted to the Department
of the Interior through the FTA and is [therefore a] violation of the APA."9
Because the FITA provides specific authority to the director of any
government-operated federal laboratory to enter into CRADAs such as the one
in question here, the ultimate question under the FTTA claim was whether
Yellowstone National Park constitutes a federal "laboratory "91 The court's
standard of review in determining whether the Park Service had in fact ex-
ceeded its authority under the FTTA was critical to the plaintiffs' case. Plain-
tiffs argued that in reviewing a claim under the APA section 706(2)(c), the
85. Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (citingNational RifleAssoc. of Am. v. Potter, 628 F.Supp. 903,909-10
(D.D.C. 1986); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F.Supp. 443,447-49 (D.D.C. 1980); Michigan United Conserva-
tion Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d, 207 (6" Cir. 1991)(expressly agreeing with and adopting the reasoning of
National Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Potter); and Bicycle Trails Council of Mann v. Babbitt 82 F.#d 1445,
1449-50 n.2 (9" Cir. 1996) (expressly adopting the findings in Potter)).
86. Id. at 16. Importantly, however, the Edmonds Icourt explicitly deferred its detenmnation whether
the CRADA actually called for commercial use of natural products until such time as it did have a chance
to review the claim on the merits. Likewise, the court deferred its decision whether the Park Service's
overall interpretation of its regulations was "reasonable" under the second prong of the Chevron doctrine.
87. See Plaintiff' Motion for Summary Judgment and Accompanying Memo in Support, Edmonds
II, at 10. On file with author [hereinafter PI. Memo].
88. Edmondslat 10.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
90. P1.Memo at 10.
91. Id. at 11-12.
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two-pronged standard of review established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. should control.92 Under Chevron, a review-
ing court first asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise ques-
tion at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear [by the terms of the statute
itself], that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."93 Where the
statute is unambiguous, "judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and excep-
tional circumstances."94 Based upon this process of statutory review, plaintiffs
urged the Edmonds II court to look to the particular statutory language at
issue." The specific language in question defines a CRADA as
[a]ny agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and
one or more non-Federal parties under which the
Government...and the non-Federal parties provide funds, per-
sonnel, services, facilities, equipment, intellectual property, or
other resources toward the conduct of specified research or
development efforts which are consistent with the mission of the
laboratory 96
As plaintiffs further pointed out, the FTTA defines a "laboratory" as: "a
facility or group of facilities owned, leased, or otherwise used by a Federal
agency, a substantial purpose of which is the performance or research, devel-
opment or engineenng by [its employees]."97 Based upon this clear language
of the FTTA, plaintiffs reiterated that Yellowstone is not a "laboratory "98
In the alternative, plaintiffs reasoned that even absent the FTTA definition,
a common definition of the term "laboratory" could "in no way be used by
defendants to extrapolate the authority of the FTTA onto the activities they
have entered into for Yellowstone National Park."99 Plaintiffs relied on a
common dictionary definition of laboratory as "a place equipped for experi-
mental study in science or for testing and analysis."' °
Under the Chevron standard of review paradigm, and based upon the fore-
going discussion of the statutory language in question, plaintiffs argued that
the term "laboratory" is unambiguous, that Yellowstone National Park cannot
conceivably be considered a "laboratory" under any plain meaning of the
92. Id., see 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
94. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991).
95. P1. Memo at 12.
96. P1. Memo. at 12 (ctng 15 U.S.C. §. 3710a(d)(1) (1994) (emphasis added)).
97. P1. Memo at 14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d)(2)(A) (1994)).
98. See Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 14-15. (citing WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATEDICTIONARY (1988)) (emphasis added).
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word, and that the provisions of the FTTA do not subsequently grant Yellow-
stone National Park the authority to enter in the CRADA.'0'
Furthermore, plaintiffs argued that even under the second prong of the
Chevron doctrine, the NPS clearly exceeded its statutory authority under the
FTTA.102 The second prong of the Chevron doctrine applies only where the
terms of the statute are ambiguous. 3 The court must then look to whether the
agency's interpretation is a "permissible construction of the statute."'" To
determine whether the agency's interpretation constitutes a permissible con-
struction of the statute, the court may look to the intent of Congress. 05
Plaintiffs pointed to several examples of unique laboratories specifically
contemplated by Congress while discussing the FTTA on the Senate floor."°
Such specific examples, plaintiffs argued, place a "reasonable limtation" on
the statute's definition of the term "laboratory."'0 7 Plaintiffs contended that
even as broad an interpretation of the term "laboratory" as contemplated by
the NPS should not be construed to include Yellowstone National Park.108
Interior responded by claiming that Yellowstone Park is, in fact, a "labora-
tory" under the FTA."° In doing so, Interior recognized that the court's
standard of review would be critical in determining whether the Park Service's
broad interpretation of the term "laboratory" within the FTTA fell within the
purview of the APA. "I Interior agreed that the APA provisions were control-
ling, but emphasized that this standard afforded great deference to the
101. 1l
102. aL at 16.
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
104. Id.
105. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440,463, n.8 (1937); Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499,503-04 (1962).
106. Pl. Memo at 18. Plaintiffs' examples included the U.S. Geological Survey's Earth Resources
Observation System Data Center, a government entity interested in establishing public-pnvate partnerships
for remote sensing applications, and the National Center for Toxicological Research, a federal research
center under the authority of the Food and Drug Adnumstration. Id.
107. Id. at 18-19.
108. Id. at 19. in addition, plaintiffs argued that the Park Service's expansive interpretation of "labora-
tory" contravened Presidential intent, citing Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13414 (1987), in which
President Reagan ordered each department head to "delegate authority to its government-owned,
government-operated Federal laboratones" to enter CRADAs as defined by the FiTA. Plaintiffs also argued
that the agency's past interpretation of the FITA supported a more narrow reading than that now advocated
by the NPS. Plaintiffs here cited the Department of Interior's FiMA training manual interpretation of the
FITA as applying to Federal laboratories only. With these final arguments, plaintiffs concluded that
"defendant's have stretched the FITA's definition of 'laboratory' beyond Congressional, Presidential and
agency interpretation in an illegal attempt to obtain the authority to transfer the natural resources of Yellow-
stone to a private entity through a CRADA. They have thereby set a dangerous precedent which threatens
the conservation of natural resources in all our national parks." PI. Memo at 19-21.
109. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Edmonds 11, at 20
[hereinafter Def. Memo].
I10. Id.
214 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.21
agency's statutory interpretation:"'.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the "arbitrary and capri-
cious standard" of the [APA] is "highly deferential" and pre-
sumes the validity of agency action. If the court can discern a
rational basis for the agency's decision, that decision must be
affirmed. Similarly, the court must uphold the agency's con-
struction of the statute unless it is plainly unreasonable." 1
2
Interior asserted that the term "laboratory" under the FTTA is open to inter-
pretation by the Park Service," 3 implying that the second prong of the Chev-
ron doctrine applied." 4 Interior's argument simply ignored the first prong of
the Chevron doctrine." 5 Interestingly, just as plaintiffs cited the statutory
definition of "laboratory" in arguing that Yellowstone can not conceivably be
considered a laboratory, Interior looked to the statutory definition of "labora-
tory" to bolster its assertion that the term is open to a broad interpretation,
arguing that "at a bare mnimum, [the NPS] determination on the issue was not
arbitrary and capricious."'"16 Interior argued that "there should be no dispute
that Yellowstone consists of a 'facility or group of facilities' owned by a
federal agency " " Although the term "facility" is not defined within the
FTTA itself, Interior borrowed from other portions of the United States Code
in order to provide the court with a working definition of "facility" Interior
then listed in exhaustive detail how "a substantial purpose" of the facilities is
"the performance of research" by federal employees, including a list of prior
collaborative efforts with private entities and the benefits of these efforts." 8
Interior thus claimed that the FTTA does not require that "each and every
111. Id. The NPS agreed that the court should be concerned with whether the Park Service's action
in entering into the CRADA was "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
112. Def. Memo at 20-21 (quoting United Transportation Union v. Lewis, 711 F.2d 233,252 (D.C. Cir.
1983)(internal citations omitted); see also American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 594, 595
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
113. Id. at 21-22.
114. Id. at 22.
115. See Id.
116. Id. at21-22.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 25-27. The Park maintains and coordinates its scientific efforts through the Yellowstone
Center for Resources, an arm of the Park that employs approximately 43 individuals, "most of whom have
doctorates and other advanced academic degrees and are substantially engaged in scientific research
activities at the Park." Id. The NPS pointed out specifically that the Park Service has worked cooperatively
with such private interests as Lockheed-Martin Corporation and Diversa in the past and that such efforts
have enhanced understanding of Brucella, a bison disease, and wolf genetics. The NPS also note that the
Park has worked with NASA, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Agricultural Research Service, the Depart-
ment of Energy's Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, the National Academy of
Sciences/National Research Council, and the National Marine Mammal Laboratory. Id.
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piece of a federal entity be devoted purely to research in order for the entity
to be able to enter into a CRADA."'t 9 Interior reasoned that the Park Service
is merely the "administrative and operational structure authorized to manage
the natural resources and facilities under its jurisdiction" and is therefore the
most appropriate entity to "enter into a CRADA as a legal matter.'1 2 Further-
more, under the Chevron doctrine, where a statutory term is ambiguous, a
reviewing court may look to the legislative history of an Act to determine its
meaning or to determine whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable."12
Interior countered plaintiffs' claim that the legislative history of the FTTA
supported a "narrow" reading of the term "laboratory" by citing language from
debate on the Senate floor and Senate reports indicating that the FTITA was
intended to include the "widest possible range of research institutions operated
by the Federal Government."
1 22
Finally, Interior argued that recent statutory provisions also confirm its
authority to enter into the CRADA.1P Interior cited the National Parks Omni-
bus Management Act, an act "which specifically addresses the important
scientific and research activities of our national parks, and strongly encourages
them to cooperate in research efforts with the private sector." 24 Several of the
Omnibus Act's stated goals, as well as specific statutory language, authorized
the Secretary of Interior to entertain requests from the public and private
sectors "for the use of any umt of the National Park System for the purposes
of scientific study "" Interior thus contended that Congress had made its
intent clear that national parks were to enter into agreements with private
industry for the purpose of scientific research and that this authority extended
to entering into CRADAs under the VITA.
126
In sum, Interior's arguments were premised upon the notion that the arbi-
trary and capricious standard of review affords great deference to an agency's
119. Idat28.
120. Id Intenor explicitly noted that it made no assertion about the legality of other CRADAs into
which the Park Service may enter, only that the terms of this CRADA were well within the Park Service's
legal authority as the administrative body carrying out the CRADA. Id. at 29.
121. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
122. Def. Memo at 30; see S.Rep. No. 99-283, at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3442,
3453. Moreover, defendants cited a specific instance in which the remote sensing devices used by the
United States Geological Survey were to be considered a laboratory under the FITA and suggested that
these devices are "strikingly similar to one of the many types of research activities conducted by Yellow-
stoneNational Park", concluding that "[t]o the extent that Congress explicitly recognized that USGS facility
falls within the definition of a laboratory, it implies that the same must be true for the activities conducted
at Yellowstone." Def. Memo at 30-31.
123. Def. Memo at 30.
124. Il
125. Id. at 33, See 16 U.S.C.A. § 5935(a) (1998).The Omnibus Act also provided that the Secretary
may "enter into negotiations with the research community and private industry for equitable, efficient
benefits-shanng arrangements." See 16 U.S.C.A. § 5935 (d) (1998).
126. Def. Memo at 33.
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interpretation of statutory language.'27 Therefore, Interior concluded that it
had reasonably interpreted Yellowstone as a "laboratory" under the FTTA and
that this reasonable interpretation must be upheld by the court.'z8
The plaintiffs then replied with a further refinement of their claim by pro-
viding a more in-depth analysis of the FT A' s provisions and intent." 9 Plain-
tiffs first argued that the Park's resources are not "technologies" as contem-
plated by the FTTA, and that "even assuming, arguendo, that Yellowstone
research facilities constitute a 'laboratory' under the FTTA, the existence of
this purported laboratory would still be irrelevant, in that the CRADA at issue
does not deal with any 'materials, inventions or contributions developed at
these facilities.""
130
Neither Interior nor plaintiffs contested the fact that the CRADA at issue
provides for the transfer of raw natural resources, and not technologies, from
the Park to a private corporation. 131 In entering into the CRADA, therefore,
plaintiffs claimed that the Park Service's "primary contribution to the CRADA
is opening up the Park's resources for commercial exploitation," rather than
"the creation of ideas or inventions at Yellowstone's research facilities. 32
For the CRADA to be valid, therefore, "the entirety of Yellowstone National
Park would have to be classified as a federal laboratory," an "absurd" conclu-
sion. 33 On this basis, plaintiffs claimed it is irrelevant that the Park may
contain "facilities or a group of facilities" that may be classified as laborato-
ries as the Park itself cannot be considered a laboratory "'
However, plaintiffs further contended that a "substantial purpose" of the
Park is not "research, development or engineering," contrary to NPS claims. '35
Drawing upon NPSOA and Yellowstone's Organic Act,'36 plaintiffs noted that
the Park is a "tract of land" dedicated and set apart as a public park or
pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people" and "for the
preservation, from injury or spoilation, of all timber, mimeral deposits, natural
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Opposition to Defendant's
Partial Summary Judgement, and Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgement on Counts I, II, and II., Edmonds II, at 9. [hereinafter P1. Reply].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Plaintiffs additionally pointed out that the administrative record shows that Yellowstone's
research facilities have not historically engaged in "actual ongoing research and development project
collaboration with permittees that collect biological specimens" from the Park. Moreover, plaintiffs pointed
out that Congress had specifically stated that the primary purpose of the FTTA is to "take technologies that
originate in the laboratories and to stimulate or support their development and commercialization." Id.
(citing FITA code).
133. P1. Reply at 9.
134. Id. at ll.
135. Id.
136. See discussion infra.
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curiosities, or wonder and their retention in their natural condition." '137
Based upon this analysis, plaintiffs reiterated their conclusion that Yellow-
stone National Park is not a "laboratory" within the meaning intended by the
FrTA.138 Moreover, drawing upon their earlier arguments, plaintiffs claimed
that the FTTA' s intent was clear in that the FITA applies to federal laborato-
ries only.19 Under the Chevron doctrine's standard of review, where a statu-
tory intent is clear, "that is the end of the matter." 4 ' As such, plaintiffs argued
that the court need not look any further in finding that the Park Service had
exceeded its authority in entering into the CRADA. 14 '
Finally, plaintiffs rebutted Interior's suggestion that by enacting the Na-
tional Park Omnibus Act, Congress "removed any doubt on the point" of
whether the entirety of Yellowstone National Park is a laboratory that can sign
CRADAs. Plaintiffs concluded, "however convenient it might currently
seem to defendants, the [Omnibus Act] was not intended to be, nor can [it] be
construed as, a carte blanche to the agency for violations of other federal
statutes...The [Omnibus Act] does not amend the FTTA and does not autho-
rize" the Park Service to act in contravention of the Organic Acts creating both
Yellowstone and the Park Service.43
Presented with these arguments, the Edmonds court, citing the second prong
of the Chevron analysis, found that defendants had provided a "reasoned basis
for concluding that the broad, statutorily-assigned definition [of laboratory]
encompasses Yellowstone's extensive research facilities."'"' Although the
court agreed with the plaintiffs that a national park does not "immediately
conjure the term 'laboratory,"' the court concluded that the Park Service did
have the authority under the FTTA to enter in CRADAs such as the one in
137. PI. Reply at 12 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 22 (1994)). In addition, plaintiffs pointed out the court had
already determined that NPSOA's "primary purpose" is the "conservation of wildlife resources." Edmonds
I at 6. Specifically, Congress had directed the Park Service "to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic object and wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such a manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 22 (1994)).
138. PI. Reply at 12.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). Plaintiffs had already stated their rationale for employing
the Chevron doctrne as the appropriate standard of review.
141. P1. Reply at 12. Plaintiffs also reiterated much of their earlier arguments regarding the applicabil-
ity of the FITA in the present situation. Here, plaintiffs claimed that, even if the FITA is not clear on its
face, the Park Service's and Executive Branch's prior interpretation of the FTA, and the Act's legislative
history all indicate that Yellowstone has never been contemplated as a "laboratory." Id. at 8-12.
142. Id. at 17; Here, plaintiffs pointed out that three main purposes of the Omnibus Act are to (1) more
effectively achieve the mission of the National Park Service; (4) encourage others to use the National Park
System for study to the benefit of the park management a well as broader scientific value, where such study
is consistent with the Act ofAugust 25, 1916 (commonly known as the National Park Service OrganicAct;
16 U.S.C. I et. Seq.); and, (5) encourage the publication and dissemination of information derived from
studies in the National Park System." (emphasis added) Id. at 17-18.
143. Id.
144. Edmonds fIat 10.
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question. '45 The court, stated, furthermore, that plaintiffs' reliance on a "plain
meaning" argument was misplaced, because Congress assigned a definition to
"laboratory" in FTTA that included "facilities owned or otherwise used by a
federal agency "'46 The court then looked to the ordinary meaning of "facil-
ity," since it was not defined in the statute, and found that "the extensive array
of research facilities at Yellowstone plainly satisfy this definition."' 47 The
court relied heavily upon the NPS showing that a substantial purpose of the
facilities is scientific research, a requisite for falling within the definition of
laboratory under the FTTA. '48
The court also determined that the CRADA clearly fell within the National
Parks Omnibus Management Act's directives to the NPS to "'enter into nego-
tiations with the research community and private industry for equitable, effi-
cient benefits-shanng arrangements' with a private entity for the purposes of
scientific study "" Further, the court reasoned, if Congress wanted to fore-
close Yellowstone or any other park system unit from entering into these
cooperative agreements, it could have done so, and Congress' refusal to fore-
close these options is indicative that the CRADA supports congressional
intent. 150
B. Commercial Use of Yellowstone's Natural Resources
Although the court ruled that Yellowstone was a laboratory for the purposes
of FTTA, the Organic Acts of Yellowstone and the Park Service, along with
their implementing regulations, still presented several obstacles to implement-
ing the CRADA. For example, it is illegal for visitors to remove pine cones or
antlers from the Parks, even though it is highly questionable whether any
environmental harm would come from such activity However, such policies
are not meant to protect the Park's resources only, but to affirm that the Na-
tional parks belong equally to all U.S. citizens.
The court thus addresses whether the Organic Acts of Yellowstone National
Park and the National Park Service, and their implementing regulations, af-
forded the Park Service with the authority to implement the CRADA. Simply
stated, because the CRADA arguably provided for the extraction of natural
resources from the park for commercial enterprises, plaintiffs claimed that the
CRADA's provisions were contrary to the mission of Yellowstone and the
Park Service as whole.1 51 In addition, and perhaps more to the point, plaintiffs
145. Id.
146. Id. at l1.
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id. at 10-13.
149. Id. at 14 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 5935(a) (1998)).
150. Id. at 14-15.
151. P1. Memo at 23.
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claimed that the CRADA violated Park Service regulations embodying the
rmssion of the Park Service which prohibits "the sale or commercial use of
natural products," if not the intent of the Orgamc Acts themselves.
152
Plaintiffs argued that the courts have determined the NPSOA places a spe-
cific emphasis on conservation above other considerations. 53 In Michigan
United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, the court stated that "unlike national
forests, Congress did not regard the National Park system to be compatible
with consumptive use.'54 Rather, Congress intended the Park Service to man-
age the system in order to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and wildlife therein."' 55 Plaintiffs argued that the Park Service had
recognized this principle for park management in promulgating regulations
wich prohibited the "sale or commercial use of natural products."'56 Addi-
tionally, the Park Service has issued rules which incorporate this principle.'57
As such, plaintiffs argued that the "consumptive use" of Park resources em-
bodied in the CRADA violated the Park Service's overarching mission as well
as its implementing regulations designed to carry out that mission. 8
Plaintiffs then reiterated their earlier arguments with regard to the appropri-
ate standard of review, stating that courts have found the NPSOA to provide
"broad, but not unlimited discretion in determimng what actions are best
calculated to protect park resources."' 59 Although the NPSOA does provide
discretion to the Park Service, the Park Service must at least "articulate the
standards and principles that govern [its] discretionary decisions in as much
detail as possible."'"6 Yet, plaintiffs asserted, the Park Service had "provided
no reasoned explanation for tis istoric and fundamental shift in national park
lands management."'
' 61
Because the CRADA violated the overarching mission of the Park Service,
152. PI. Memo at 22. From plaintiffs' perspective, the very heart of the issue involved in this case was
whether the Park Service is authorized to commercialize the park's natural resources and act as a broker in
marketing these "commodities." To this end, the Edmonds plaintiffs relied on both legal and spiritual
arguments. Il at 22-23.
153. Id. at 23. See Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 207 (6' Cir. 1991)
(citing National Rifle Ass'n. of America v. Potter, 628 F.Supp. 903, 909 (D.D.C. 1986).
154. Michigan, 949 F.2d at 207.
155. Id
156. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(c)(3)(v) (1999).
157. See, e.g., 51 Fed. Reg. 28110 (1986) The Park Service must "provide protection to all natural
features of a national park system area." Id.
158. PI. Memo at 22-23.
159. Id. at 24 (quoting Daingerfield Island, 40 F.3d at 446).
160. Id at 25 (citing Kent Farm Co. v. Hills, 417 F. Supp. 297,302 (D.D.C. 1976) (quoting Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Citing the admimstrative
record, plaintiffs further referred the court to a statement from the Secretary of Interior in which the Secre-
tary admits that the CRADA at issue is the "first ever natural resource commercial use venture in a national
park," and that the CRADA had already been used to "expand the commercial use management principle
to other federal lands." Pl.'s Memo at 26.
161. PI.Memoat26.
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as well as its implementing regulations, and because the Park Service had not
offered any reasoning upon which it had based this "fundamental shift" in
Park policy, plaintiffs claimed that the agency's action can be afforded no
deference and must therefore be enjoined. 162
Interior opened its argument on the Organic Acts by claiming that, under the
appropriate standard of review, the NPS should be afforded wide discretion in
"implementing its statutory responsibilities under authorizing statutes" and
that this is especially important when agencies have interpreted implementing
regulations: 163 "[I]n construing administrative regulations, the ultimate cnte-
non is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."' 64 Interior
argued that it was afforded great interpretive deference by the organic acts of
the both Yellowstone and the NPS in fulfilling its mission. 165 In fact, the vast
majority of Interior's argument consisted of a recitation of the internal
correspondences, discussions, meetings and other considerations undertaken
by the NPS prior to entering into the CRADA. 166 Based upon these internal
considerations, Interior claimed that it "ultimately came to the very sensible
conclusion that entering into this agreement would be consistent with law,
would facilitate valuable scientific research, and would enhance the Park's
ability to carry out its primary mission of protecting its natural features."' 167
Significantly, however, Interior claimed that plaintiffs had misinterpreted
CRADA, and CRADA would not result in a "consumptive use" as plaintiffs
had argued. 168 Citing its own administrative interpretation of the CRADA.
Interior argued that the "CRADA does not authorize any otherwise prohibited
consumptive use of park resources because none of the organisms themselves
are being sold or otherwise transferred for any non-research-related consump-
tive purpose."' 69 Defendants explained that, under the terms of the CRADA.
Diversa would obtain no title to specimens they collect and that the amount of
material taken from the Park is no different from that taken by any other re-
searchers in the Park.170
162. Id. at 27. The remainder of plaintiffs' argument pertaining to Counts I1 and Il focused upon
countering Interior's claim that a separate regulation providing for the Park Service to issue research permits
within the Park supercedes the prohibition on commercialization of natural products derived from the Park.
Plaintiffs' claim rested upon the assertion that such permits issued by the Park Service must be for scientific
research purposes only and are constrained by the prohibition on commercializing Park resources. Id. at 27-
30.
163. Def. Memo at 33-34 (citing Sierra Club, 487 F Supp. at 450).
164. Id. at 34-35 (quoting United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (internal quotation
omitted).
165. Id. at 33-34.
166. Id. at 35-38.
167. Id. at 35.
168. Id. at 39-40.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 40.
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Moreover, Interior explained that patent laws draw a distinction between
naturally occurring organisms, which are not patentable, and scientific discov-
eries derived from the study of such organisms, which are patentable.'71
Interior thus concluded that neither of the Organic Acts nor the regulation
prohibiting the sale or commercial use of natural products from the Park pro-
hibit the Park Service from entering into the CRADA.'7 2
Similar to the issue of whether Yellowstone is a laboratory, the Edmonds 11
court's reasomng closely paralleled Interior's arguments to rule that Interior
had "offered a reasoned basis explaining how the CRADA [was] consistent
with the organic statutes and regulations." 173 The court deterined that defen-
dants had provided a rational basis for how entering into the CRADA was
consistent with NPSOA and the Yellowstone Organic Act.1 74 The court also
found Interior's discussion of how the CRADA would not authorize "con-
sumptive use" of park resources particularly persuasive:
More fundamentally, however, the CRADA does not conflict
with the conservation mandate of the organic statutes because
it does not grant Diversa the right to collect any research speci-
mens at all. Indeed, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, neither the
CRADA nor its Scope of Work authorizes Diversa to take any
natural materials from Yellowstone. Rather, the CRADA out-
lines the rights and responsibilities of Yellowstone and Diversa
with respect to information and inventions developed after the
conclusion of research specimen collection and analysis.
In mounting a frontal attack on the CRADA, plaintiffs fail to
recogmze this critical distinction. While they challenge the
CRADA, they do not in any way contend that the research per-
int issued to Diversa is improper or is otherwise invalid. In-
deed, plaintiff's misconception of the legal force of the
CRADA reveals the fundamental flaw in their challenge. If the
court were to find that the CRADA was improper under rele-
vant statutes, Diversa could still collect specimens under a re-
search permt, as it has since 1994. The only - albeit critical -
difference would be that Yellowstone could not share in any of
the potential benefits from Diversa's research. Instead, the posi-
tive gains from the research would go exclusively to Diversa. 175
171. U at41.
172. Id. at 42-43.
173. Edmonds H1at 15-16.
174. Ia. at 18.
175. Id. at 18-19.
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The Edmonds II court thus ruled for Interior on all counts.
V CONCLUSION
As of this writing, plaintiffs intend to appeal the court's ruling in Edmonds
11.176 Throughout much of its holding in Edmonds H, the court employed
technical interpretations of the F1TA and legal determinations of the degree
of discretion afforded to the Park Service in carrying out its mssion under the
NPSOA and Yellowstone Organic Act. In effect, the Edmonds H court has
provided the Park Service with the means to "commodify" park resources in
the name of park conservation. In its most basic terms, this case presents a
critical question regarding the purposes of national parks in general and, more
specifically, how the Park Service ought to achieve those ends: Should na-
tional parks and their resources be available for extraction by private
commercial interests9
Although Interior took great pains in explaining (and convinced the court)
how the CRADA at issue does not provide for commercial use of park re-
sources, it is undisputed that Diversa is a commercial enterprise and seeks to
make use of park resources for commercial purposes.'77 Moreover, the present
agreement with Diversa represents the first time that a national park has en-
tered into a profit-sharing agreement with a private commercial interest, there-
by directly linking the Park Service's financial future to commercial, extrac-
tive interests within the Park.
In sum, the Edmonds H Court's ruling has upheld the improbable conclusion
that Yellowstone National Park is a "laboratory" under the FTTA. In addition.
the bioprospecting program, and the court's decision to uphold it, validates a
back-door, albeit clever, approach to allowing policies and programs which on
their face appear to be prohibited both by the NPSOA and Yellowstone Or-
ganic Acts as well as by Congressional intent of how the Parks should be
managed and protected. Such back-door maneuvering is a poor approach to
implementing drastic, and highly controversial, policy changes and defeat the
spirit of an open government approach to democracy Further, it has put the
American public at the point at which it must ask itself whether, "[i]n today's
world, the parks should be places where the populace can be inspired with the
wonder of nature and the understanding that some things are too special to be
sold."'178
176. Telephone Interview with Joseph Mendelson III, Attorney for Plaintiffs (May 1, 2000).
177. As discussed in the court's holding above, this case does at least implicitly questions the entire
permitting system provided by Park Service regulation. While this topic is certainly worthy of greater
discussion, it is beyond the scope of this article and is therefore left for perhaps a future article on that topic
alone.
178. Doremus, supra note 3, at 438.
